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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES,
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.

No. 15701

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH: MILLY O. BERNARD, Chairman;
OLOF E. ZUNDEL, Commissioner; and
KENNETH RIGTRUP, Commissioner,
Defendants and Respondents

BRIEF OF INTERVENOR - APPELLANT
BUSINESS TELEPHONE SYSTEMS OF UTAH, INC.
PRELIMINARY STA'rEMENT, DISPOSITION
BELOW, AND RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This is an appeal from a Final Report and Order of the
Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission" or "PSC"), in
PSC Case No. 76-049-01, approving several business telephone
equipment iervice tariffs filed by Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell", "MBT" or "Applicant").
Appellant Business Telephone Systems, Inc. ("BTS"), Intervenor
below, challenges the lawfulness of a new Mountain Bell con-·
tract payment plan, and of a Mountain Bell costing methodology,
sanctioned by the Commission for use in connection with competitive terminal telephone equipment services.

Intervenor-

Appellant seeks reversal of the Report and Order of the
Commission, and rejection of both the two-tier lease-contract
tariffs and the incremental pricing methodology approved by
the
PSCby for
byLawMountain
Bell.
Sponsored
the S.J.use
Quinney
Library. Funding
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Procedural History

On September 1, 1976, Mountain Bell filed a Petition and
accompanying tariff sheets with respect to a business telephone service, known as Dimension 400 PBX, which it proposed
to offer.

Though suspended· initially for a brief period of

time, the proposed tariffs were made effective by order dated
October 1, 1976, "subject to the further modification, amendment, or suspension of said tariff by the Commission
The Dimension PBX tariffs provided the customer with the option of paying for service under one of two payment plans, a
"two-tier" or "lease payment" plan, and a "conventional", or
straight monthly payment plan.

While the second, or "conven-

tional", payment plan levies a traditional single rate for
each month that the customer subscribes to service, as noted
below, the two-tier lease payment concept is far more complex.
(See Ex. 2, R.

1492~

Tr. 46-47, 67-73.)

On· September 22, 1976, Appellant Business Telephone
Systems of Utah, Inc. ("BTS"), was officially admitted by the
Commission as an intervenor in Case No. 76-049-01.
On October 15, 1976, Mountain Bell filed a proposal to
restructure, along the lines proposed in the Dimension 400 PBX
tariff, the manner in which other of its business telephone
!/See Order of PSC, issued October 1, 1976, R. 1137-43.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.!/

- 3 -

services are provided in the State of Utah.

This proposal was

consolidated for hearing with the Dimension 400 PBX petition
on December 2, 1976, and the PSC indicated that the Commission
would determine, following the close of hearings, the Commission
would determine whether these other tariffs should be "suspended,
amended or made permanent".

(Tr. 315)

Finally, on November 5, 1976, Mountain Bell filed a
Petition and accompanying tariff sheets by which it proposed
to offer still another telephone system service, known as
ComKey 2152, on the two-tier, incremental cost basis.

This

third set of tariffs became effective on December 4, 1976,
subject to further Order after hearing.

Hearings on this ad-

ditional matter were consolidated with the Petition and proposal already consolidated in Case No. 76-049-01.
Hearings were held November 29 and 30, 1976, December 1
and 2, 1976, and February 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8, 1977.
On December 2, 1977, the Commission entered its Final
Report and Order in PSC Case No. 76-049-01, approving
Mountain Bell's Dimension 400 PBX petition, its ComKey 2152
2/
petition, and its business telephone services proposal.l/Intervenor-Appellant BTS was not immediately served with
the PSC's Final Report and Order, but, after learning about
it by telephone during the second week of December, 1977,
Intervenor's counsel called the Secretary of the Commission
and requested a copy thereof, which was ultimately received
by undersigned counsel on December 16, 1977.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on January 4, 1978, BTS filed an Appliation for Rehearing with
the Commission, which was denied on January 30, 1978.

The in-

stant proceeding was commenced by the filing of a Petition for
writ of Certiorari on March 1, 1978.

By motion filed May 30,

1978, Mountain Bell moved to dismiss BTS's Petition for Writ
of Certiorari and to quash the Writ issued pursuant thereto.
MBT's motion was denied by this Court on June 9, 1978.
Subsequently, by motion filed June 12, 1978, Mountain Bell
moved for reconsideration of its Motion to Dismiss BTS's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, but said Motion for
Reconsideration was, in turn, denied by this Court on June 13,
1978.
2.

Two-Tier TelaLease Pricing and Mountain Bell's
Incremental Costing Methodology

All of the terminal telephone equipment tariffs at issue
in PSC Case No. 76-049-01 offer the customer two-tier lease
rates as well as a conventional payment plan.

The two-tier

or lease payment plan purportedly divides the cost of terminal
telephone equipment service into two components and utilizes
present worth analysis.

The first component, or Tier "A" por-

tion of the rate, is paid over a predetermined initial payment
contract period which is as long as, or shorter than, the full
economic life of the equipment involved.

As the Commission

observed in its Report and Order:
Mountain Bell proposed to make available
to Utah business customers the two-tier
TelaLease
payment
option
ofby the
3,Institute
5, 7of Museum
or 10and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
provided
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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years, as the case may be, for PBX and
fixed key telephone service. Under the
TelaLease option, the telephone customer's
monthly payment consists principally of
two portions or tiers: capital-related
costs and expense-related costs. "Tier A"
is payable over a fixed period of time
of either 3, 5, 7 or 10 years depending
upon the type of terminal equipment provided. At the end of the fixed payment
period, "Tier A" payments terminate.
"Tier B" payments run contemporaneously
with "Tier A" but continue after "Tier A"
payments end. "Tier B" is composed of a
fixed portion and a variable portion,
both of which are payable throughout
the period a customer retains the service.
(Report and Order, p. 6, R. 1139)
Under the TelaLease proposal, if a customer discontinues
service pursuant to the two-tier lease plan prior to the expiration of the initial contract period, a termination charge
is levied equal to the sum of the monthly charges for the unexpired portion of the initial lease period.

Presumably, the

Tier "A" rates are designed to recover non-recurting-capital
costs. Tier "A" rates are not subject to change for any particular customer, although new vintage Tier "A" rates, for
new customers, may be filed from time to time.

The second

component, or Tier "B" rate, is divided into a variable portion, designed to recoup recurring expenses, and a constant
portion equal to 18% of the Tier "A" rate, designed to recover part of the capital costs.

The Tier "B" rate continues

for so long as the customer keeps his service, is not set by
lease, is always subject to change, and is the same for all
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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subscribers at any given time.
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(Ex. 2, R. 1492; Ex. 5; Tr.

46-47, 67-73, 117-18, 159-60, 215-16)
Under the TelaLease payment option, the customer allegedly makes a contractual commitment to pay a fixed monthly rate
for a fixed period of years.

This Tier "A" charge is designed

to recover the three basic components of capital

cost,~-~·,

"depreciation, the cost of money and the income tax".
131; and see Tr. 215-16)

(Tr.

Once established for a given instal-

lation, the Tier "A" rate applicable to that customer is intended by Mountain Bell to remain unchanged and is not subject
to rate increase:
The applicable monthly Fixed rent will
apply without change during the Fixed
Rent Payment Period.
(See original sheet
23, Part 11, Section 6 ~the Dimension
400 PBX tariff, R. 1068; Tr. 157.)
Turning to the Mountain Bell's incremental costing methodology, utilized for competitive services only, the PSC's Report
and Order states that all of the terminal telephone equipment
tariffs in question filed by Mountain Bell were based upon a
so-called Long Run Incremental Analysis (LRIA) "taking into
account cost factors, demand elasticity, cross-elasticity,
payment plans, incrementalism and contribution".
Order, p. 7, R. 1140)

(Report and

According to Mountain Bell, the basic

purposes of its LRIA:
are to estimate the future impact of
a pricing decision, because all pricing deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

7 -

cisions are made for results that they
will cause in the future. And it - the
second purpose is to use a tool for selecting prices. (Tr. 63)
The salient feature of Mountain Bell's LRIA, for purposes of
this appeal, is that it represents an incremental approach to
costs.

This incremental approach takes into account only

"directly related" or additional costs of administration resulting from the particular new service (Tr. 452) and ignores
or overlooks common overhead costs of the utility.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I - THE COMMISSION ERRED IN APPROVING THE TWO-TIER
TELALEASE PAYMENT PLAN.
A.

The Two-Tier TelaLease Payment Plan Concept
Constitutes A Predatory, Anti-Competitive,
Exclusionary Pricing Technique In Restraint Of Trade
Which Is Designed And Intended To Maintain Mountain
Bell's Monopoly In The Terminal Telephone Equipment
Market In Utah.

State regulatory agencies have repeatedly been required
to consider and enforce antitrust policies where public utility services are concerned.

Gulf States Utilities Co. v.

Federal Power Comm'n., 411 U.S. 747 (1973); Otter Tail Power
3/
Co. v. United States, 410 u.s. 366 (1973)Appellant respectfully submits that the Commission below did not properly consider or enforce these policies.
3/See also Northern California Power Agency v. California
Public Utilities Comm'n., 96 Cal. Rep. 18, 46 P. 2d 1218
(1971), where the California state regulatory body was required to consider the antitrust laws, both state and federal, in the case of a public utility company seeking to construct and operate an electric power plant; Phonetele, Inc.
v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 113 Cal. Rep. 16, 520 P. 2d 400
(1974), in which the Supreme Count of California, in applying
the law of Northern California Power Agency to a telephone interconnection tariff, articulated principles calling upon the
Commission to carefully weigh competitive factors to assure
that a tariff was not being, and would not be, used for anticompetitive monopoly purposes.
In addition, several state regulatory agencies have considered and applied antitrust principles specifically to
two-tier contract tariffs. For example, the Colorado Public
Utilities Commission, in its decision of November 26, 1975
in Docket No. 881, rejecting a two-tier TelaLease tariff
proposed by Mountain Bell for ComKey service, stated:
(footnote continued on next page)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In a Report and Order totally devoid of citations to the
transcript or exhibit evidence in this case, the Commission
made only the following conclusory statements:
10. The TelaLease or two-tier concept of
pricing is not anti-competitive in nature
and will not artificially enable Mountain
Bell to maintain its market position • • •
11. The two-tier concept of pricing is a
permissible offering in this jurisdiction
and is a reasonable response from Mountain
Bell to the competitive market in which it
must offer its terminal equipment.
(Report and Order of December 2, 1977, at
11-12, R. 1142)
From these summary opinions, it is absolutely impossible to
determine the reasoning processes which led the Commission to
reach its conclusions.

The PSC's Report and Order amounts to

little more than an arbitrary dismissal of Interven.or-Appellant' s
(footnote continued from. previous page)
The Commission recognizes the benefits
that have accrued to the public through
the introduction of competition • . •
[C]ompetition in the areas of terminal telephone systems equipment has been
declared to be in the public interest.
Given this declaration of public policy,
it is the Commission's opinion that it
should consider the state antitrust laws
in determining whether the proposed tariffs are just and reasonable.
[ citations
omitted]
(Decision of November 26, 1975,
on reargument in Docket No. 881, at 21-22)
See also Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities Docket
1840~ecision of April 26, 1976, at 12-13, aff'd, New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. D.P.U., 363 N.E. 2d 519 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. 1977)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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allegations, without any attempt to come to grips with the issues and evidence raised and introduced below.

In fact, the

Commission's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence, and is erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.
The fallacious and arbitrary nature of the Commission's
opinion is underscored by the fact that a third party, the
Utah State Attorney General, independently scrutinized the
record evidence and filed a comprehensive amicus curiae brief
carefully explaining to the Commission how the antitrust laws
·apply to the facts of this case, and why, in the opinion of
the Attorney General's Antitrust, Trade Regulation and Consumer
Protection Section,
• • • this Commission is legally obligated
to reject the tariff proposed by Mountain
Bell in this proceeding due to the serious
anti-competitive effect that its approval
would have in the. market for PBX systems.
The two aspects of the proposal that are
most objectionable from an antitrust standpoint are the long-term leasing provisions
as.sociated with the TelaLease and the underpricing of Dimension equipment and services. The record indicates that these
two practices are designed to maintain,
increase and prevent erosion of Mountain
Bell~s dominance in the PBX market by
working to exclude and eliminate present
and potential competition. (Brief of
Attorney General, p. 26, R. 1410)1/
4/0n November 30, 1977, the
Antitrust Division, filed a
General of Texas before the
(footnote continued on next

Assistant Attorney General,
brief on behalf of the Attorney
Public Utility Commission of
page)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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It is egregious, and inexcusable, that other than a mere passing reference to the fact that the Attorney General filed a
brief before the Commission (Report and Order, p. 4, R. 1138),
no mention, discussion or analysis of the antitrust implications of the two-tier TelaLease concept appears anywhere in
5/
the Commission's Report and Order.As noted by the Utah State Attorney General, the longterm two-tier TelaLease pricing concept violates well established principles of federal antitrust law.

The offense of

monopolization involves two elements:
(1) possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market; and
(2) willful opposition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a
sup~rior product, business acumen, or historical precedent. (United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 u.s. 563 at 570-71
(1966)) (emphasis added)
Monopoly power, in turn, is defined as "[t]he power to control prices or exclude competition in a relevant market".
Grinnell, supra, at 571.
(footnote continued from previous page)
Texas, in Docket No. 156. At issue was a Dimension PBX
tariff similar to MBT's tariff in Utahr filed by Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company. That brief concurred wholeheartedly
with the Utah State Attorney General's antitrust allegations.
~/Indeed,

the Commission paid such little heed to the antitrust arguments that it even neglected to list in its Report
and Order any appearance by the Antitrust, Trade Regulation
and Consumer Protection Section of the Attorney General's office.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The very large percentage of the PBX market in the State
of Utah controlled by Mountain Bell leaves no doubt that
6/
Mountain Bell is a monpolist.Prior to 1968, Mountain Bell
was the sole supplier of terminal telephone equipment in the
State of Utah, and thus enjoyed an absolute monopoly over the
provision of PBX and key telephone equipment throughout the
area of its operation.

It was only following the 1968 deci-

sion of the Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter

of the Use of Carterfone Device, 13 FCC 2d 420 , recon. deniec
14 FCC 2d 571 (1968) ("Carterfone") - holding, inter alia,

that AT&T tariffs prohibiting the interconnection of customerprovided telephone terminal equipment were unjust and unreasonable under the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47
151 et

~

u.s.c

- that Mountain Bell [and indeed the entire Bell

Telephone System of which it is an integral part] began to experiene some slight competition in the provision of PBX and
key telephone terminal equipment and services. Both the
7/
Federal Communications Commission- and the Massachusetts

6/As of the time of hearing of this case, the total number of
Mountain Bell's PBX and key telephone customers in the State
of Utah was 9,410. (Tr. 234) By contrast, there were only
211 interconnect PBX and key telephone systems in the State
of Utah, according to Mountain Bell's own estimate. (Tr. 401:
Thus, MBT's share of the total market is 98%. (Tr. 472)

21

The present unlawfulness of the tariff
also permeates its past. It has been unreasonable and unreasonably discriminatory since its inception for the reasons
(footnote continued on next page)
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8/
Department of Public Utilities- have held that Bell's mono-

polization over telephone equipment was unlawfully obtained.
Mountain Bell, through its two-tier TelaLease payment concept, is now striving to maintain its monopoly position
9/
through the use of an anti-competitive pricing technique.-

The widely recognized decision in United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953) aff'd

~

curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), presents a situation very analo(footnote continued from previous page)
given above. That the Telephone Company
may not have known prior to the proceedings herein that the Carterfone was in
fact harmless is in fact irrelevant,
since they barred its use without regard
to its effect upon the telephone system.
Furthermore, the tariff was the carrier's
own. It was not prescribed by the
Commission. It has remained subject to
complaint and to a finding that it had
been unlawful since its inception.
A Commission-prescribed r.ate or practice
must be followed by the carrier. It becomes the lawful rate or practice. But
where the carrier itself initiates the
rate or practice its unlawfulness remains
open, not only to a proseective finding,
but also to a retrospective one.
(Carterfone, supra, at 4'25) (emphasis
added)
8/Mass. D.P.u. Docket 18403, Decision of April 21, 1976,
supra, at 24)
9/As Justice Learned Hand has recognized, " • . . no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing". United
States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 462
(2nd Cir. 1945)
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gous to the one at bar.

United Shoe held, because of United

Shoe's monopoly position, that United's ten-year leases for
10/
shoe manufacturing machinery~ constituted monopolization in

11/

violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.~

As in United

Shoe, Mountain Bell refuses to sell its PBX and key telephone
equipment outright to the public.

As in United Shoe, Mountain

Bell's Dimension PBX leases require a commitment to obtain, or
at least pay for, 10 years of service.

As in United Shoe,

MBT' s leases are designed to perpetuate Bell·' s monopoly status
in an area which has now been opened to competition.

As a

practical matter, service is provided only by means of long10/Lest the similarity between the telephone and shoe machinery industry be regarded as attenuated, it must be noted that
the relationship between the two industries dates back to the
very early days of the telephone. As John Brooks observed in
his recent book on the history of the Bell System:
• • • [S]omewhere along the way [Gardiner]
Hubbard made what would prove to be one of
the key decisions in telephone's corporate
history - the decision to rent telephone
service rather than to sell telephones apparently based on a previous successful
experience of Hubbard's in leasing shoemaking machinery.
[Brooks, Telephone, the
First Hundred Years, Harper & Rowe, 1975,
at 55] (emphasis added)
·

11/Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 u.s.c. §2 states: "Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor • . . . " Similarly, the Utah Code, Section 50-1-3,
makes it unlawful for any corporation to enter into any agreement, or combination to "monopolize any part of trade or commerce".
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term leases, since the alternative traditional month-to-month
rental rates have been set so high in relation to two-tier
TelaLease rates as to be very unappealing to the vast bulk of
MBT's business customers.

(Tr. 570, Ex. I-8, R. 1535, p.

12/

56)~

In United Shoe, Judge Wyzanski noted:
Much of United's market power is traceable to the magnetic policies inherent in
its system of leasing.

* * *
Yet, they (the leasing practices) are not
practices which can be properly described
as the inevitable consequences of ability,
natural forces, or law. They represent
something more than the use of accessible
resources, the processes of invention and
innovation, and the employment of those
techniques of employment, financing, production, and distribution, which a competitive society must foster. These are
contracts, arrangements, and policies,
which, instead of encouraging competition
based on pure merit, further the dominance
of a particular firm. In this sense they
are unnatural barriers~ they unnecessarily
exclude the actual and. potential competition~ they restrict the free market.
While the law allows many enterprises to
use such practices, the Sherman Act is
now construed by superior courts to forbid the continuance of effective market
control based in part upon such practices.
(110 F.Supp. at 344-45) (emphasis added)
The record evidence in this case, particularly Exhibit
I-1, R. 1529, the "Two-Tier Contract Plan" made available by

, 12/And see Ex. I-8, R. 1935, J.W.-19, which shows the re~a

tionship between the regular monthly rates and the two-tier
TelaLease rates for Dimension PBX.
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the American Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT&T") to MBT
in 1973 (Tr. 104), overwhelmingly demonstrates that two-tier
TelaLease pricing is anti-competitive, both in purpose and
intent.

The evidence shows that it was designed to restrain

and eliminate what little competition presently exists in the
terminal telephone equipment market in Utah.
By its own language the Two-Tier Plan applies only to
competitive telephone products and directs MBT to use, in markets of high

~ompetitive

vulnerability, contracting devices

which lock customers into Bell services over a period of
years, and to thereby join in AT&T's anti-competitive scheme.
(See Ex. I-1, R. 1529, Section 4 and Section 7, p. 2)
Section l of the Two-Tier Contract Plan directs the attention of MBT to the necessity for market analysis, including determination of "competitive price levels".
fi~st

Once this

step is taken and a market price is established,

Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Plan emphasize the importance
"from a regulatory aspect" of cost studies designed to support or: justify the selected "competitive price level".

It

ii thus clear that, from the outset, AT&T directed MBT that
the price of competitive offerings should be dictated primarily by competitive, as opposed to cost,

13/

considerations.~

The Two-Tier Contract Plan constitutes a master plot for im13/Indeed, MBT concedes:
"We price according to what the
market says is - is the right price".
(Tr. 54)
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plementation of a radical new two-tier pricing

technique~

it

discusses market and rate strategies (Section 3), and presents illustrative tariffs in contract form (Section 4) complete with rates and a computer program which can be used to
calculate two-tier costs.
Finally, the AT&T Two-Tier Contract Plan also outlines
how telephone companies should "handle" state regulatory commissions, with specified directions and instructions relating
to lobbying, in order to gain acceptance of two-tier lease
pricing and to preclude or minimize intervention and hearing.
Section 6 of the Plan (Ex. I-1, R. 1529) underscores the necessity for pre-tariff lobbying:
State regulators must be made aware of the
problem areas brought about by outside vendors and the realistic solutions made possible by unusual and often controversial
new services. This requires direct involvement in company planning on the part of state
regulatory contact people. Their knowledge
of the Commission can greatly assist planning
efforts . . . • [I]t pays off in a better understanding and a more permissive climate
(Ex. I-1, R. 1529, Section 6) (Emphasis added)
In addition, Exhibits I-8, R. 1535, J.W.-17 and J.W.-18
demonstrate that Mountain Bell received from its parent company, AT&T, guidelines and directives designed to insure that
two-tier rates would in practice provide a very strong economic
inducement for MBT's customers to enter into long-term service contracts, rather than to subscribe to telephone service
on a traditional monthly basis.

(Ex. I-8, R. 1535, p. 56)
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The record is replete with references by several witnesses
to the lock-in effect of two-tier TelaLease pricing.
I-8, R. 1535, p. 42; Tr. 650; 1001.)

(See Ex.

Such views were voiced

not only by the Intervenor-Appellant, but also by other interconnect companies (Tr. 262), by a representative of the
University of Utah (Tr. 268), and by the Commission staff's
own witness, Mr. Hogstrom.

(Ex. D-1, R. 1526, pp. 12-13)

Mr. Hogstrom indicated:
There is the danger that if we allow
Mountain Bell to offer telalease contracts,
then the market will be closed to competition.

* * *
• • . the possibility exists that with the
adoption of these telalease tariffs, a
large segment, if not all of the market,
would be closed to competition • • . .
[T]he competitor has most likely lost that
opportunity for the life of the telalease
con~ract.
This brings up the possibility
of Mountain Bell "locking up" the marketplace for a number of years by this means.
(Ex. D-1, R. 1526, pp. 12-13)
Finally, the record evidence demonstrates that in view of
Mountain Bell's overwhelming 98% monopoly share of the PBX and
key telephone market in the State of Utah (Tr. 234, 472), its
very favorable win/loss record even in the absence of two-tier
TelaLease pricing (Ex. 14, R. 1522, Tr. 388, 391, 488), the
marketing experience and expertise of MBT (Tr. 32, 383-85),
and the stringency of MBT's lease service arrangement (Tr. 115,
151, 160, 170, 207, 731-32, 968, 922-23), that denial of twoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tier TelaLease pricing would not unduly handicap Mountain Bell
in the terminal telephone equipment market.
To all of the above evidence, the PSC turned a deaf ear.
As Intervenor-Appellant's witness, Dr. Wilson, stated:
"The conduct of a firm has to be evaluated in terms of its
competitive or anti-competitive impact based upon the posture,
the position, the dominance that that firm holds within the
market."

(Tr. 923)

Such an evaluation was most assuredly not

performed by the Utah Public Service Commission in this case.

14/

The Utah Commission did not allude at all to any of the overwhelming evidence marshalled by Intervenor-Appellant, summarized above, and set forth in detail at pages 25-37 (R. 12991311) of Intervenor's initial brief to the Commission.
Because Mountain Bel·l in the past has relied on the Tenth
Circuit

u.s.

Court of Appeal's.decision in Telex Corp. v.

Internat'l. Bus. Mach. Corp., 510 F.Supp. 894 (1975), it must
be noted, even before a responsive Brief is submitted, that
any such reliance on Telex by Mountain Bell would be entirely
misplaced.
~

First, United Shoe was appealed to, and affirmed

cur iam by, t.he United States Supreme Court.

The validity

14/0bviously, when a company with 98% of the market locks up
customers, that company's market share begins to approach
100%, and competition is totally eliminated. When a company
with less than 1% of the market ties up a customer for a
period of years, the effect is pro-competitive and the continued existence of at least minimal competition is guaran5, teed.
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of Telex v. IBM was never passed upon by, and the case is not
now pending before, the United States Supreme Court.

If in

fact there were any inconsistency between United Shoe and
Telex, then surely the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion, rather
than the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals, must control.
Second, in actuality the decision in Telex. actually supports Intervenor-Appellant herein.

The trial court in Telex

found that IBM did not possess a monopoly since it enjoyed
just over 35% of the market in 1970, down.from 64% in 1952.
(510 F.2d at 898-99)
Bell's market share is

As noted earlier, in this case Mountain
98%~

down from 100%.

Moreover, in the Telex case, the leasing plan approved
by the Appellate Court was one used by all competitors.
F.2d at 902-03, 906)

(510

That is not the case in this instance.

The record below contains little or no support for the notion
that the

contract-lea~ing

scheme inherent in Mountain Bell's

two-tier TelaLease concept constitutes an ordinary and typical
marketing method employed by other competitors in the market.
At no place in the record is there any indication that
Intervenor-Appellant, or any other interconnect supplier in
Utah, utilizes "two-tier pricing".
Interconnect equipment is sold outright.

Maintenance is

obtained pursuant to a separate contract, or on a time and materials basis, from either the equipment seller or another entity.

The purchaser need not obtain such maintenance from

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 21 -

the third party leasing company, as is the case when Mountain
Bell leases equipment pursuant to its TelaLease plan.
1014-15, 1021-22)

(Tr.

Whereas Intervenor-Appellant BTS sells

equipment, title ultimately passing to the purchaser, Mountain
Bell does not sell equipment.
passes.

Title to the equipment never

Ownership is always retained by MBT, and the subscriber

is not free to take his equipment anywhere within or without
the State of Utah, to use it at another location, or to resell
12_/
it
if he so desires. (Tr. 115, 151, 160, 170, 207, 731-32,
922-23, 968)

In exchange for payment of the total cost of an

interconnect piece of terminal equipment, the customer obtains
a tangible benefit in the form of a substantial property interest.

When and if the customer elects to sell his equipment,

to purchase new equipment from another supplier, or to obtain
service from Mountain Bell, his property interest can be converted into cash.

The Mountain Bell customer receives no such

benefit of title and merely obligates himself to pay for service for a minimum period of years.

Cbmpetitive suppliers are

thereby "locked out" of the market, and the market is "locked
up" for Mountain Bell.
In contrast to the cursory treatment rendered by the
Commission below, the Public Utilities Commission of the
neighboring State of Colorado, in its first two-tier opinion
15/The evidence below establishes that there is a significant
market for used terminal telephone equipment. (Tr. 1021)
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dealing with Mountain Bell (Decision No. 86791, issued May 6
1975), considered allegations virtually identical to those
advanced by Intervenor-Protestant herein.

At issue was a

tariff for ComKey telephone service proposed by Mountain
Bell.

The Colorado Commission stated:
Respondent [Mountain Bell] finds itself
faced with competition in the marketplace
when in the very recent past it enjoyed a
virtual monopoly position

* * *
It was in response to that competition
that Respondent established the tariffs
that are here under consideration. The
Commission recognizes the benefits that
have accrued to the public through the
introduction of competition.

* * *
It is clear that Respondent has monopoly
power within the relevant market because
of its predominant share of the market
which is in excess of 92% and because of
Respondent's massive size and length of
time·as the only source of supply in the
market which has just recently changed ••
The [two-tier lease] concept was developed in combination with AT&T and perhaps Western and Bell Labs to beat the
competition they were facing and thus
violates the anti-trust statutes of this
state. There is no reason or consideration can justify this situation . . . because of the anti-trust violation involved with the tariff here under consideration . . . the tariffs here under
suspension are found and concluded to be
unjust and unreasonable.
[Decision No.
86791, May 6, 1975 at 16-18, 19] (emphasis added)

And, in its subsequent Decision and Order on Reargument,
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No. 87834, issued November 26, 1975, the Colorado Public
Utilities Commission concluded, in affirming its prior decision:
The Tele-Lease could be a means to enable
respondent to continue its control over
the • • • market and thus to tie up the
market and accomplish the market coverage
objective set by AT&T of 100% • • • •
(Decision No. 87834, p. 27) (emphasis
added)
In sum, the Commission erred in approving a two-tier
TelaLease payment plan which is exclusionary, anti-competitive,
and was designed and intended to restrain trade.
In recognition of applicable antitrust laws, and in accordance with the independent judgment and opinion of the
Utah State Attorney General, this Court should reject the twotier TelaLease payment concept, and the long-term service arrangement inherent therein.

Only by so doing, can this Court

preserve and protect what little competition now exists in ·
the terminal telephone equipment market in Utah.
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B.

The Two-Tier TelaLease Payment Plan Concept Is
Inherently And Unlawfully Discriminatory And
Preferential, In That It Insulates The Rates Of
Certain Select Subscribers To Competitive Services
Against Increases In Capital-Related Costs, While
Imposing The Burden Of Those Capital-Related Cost
Increases On All Other Mountain Bell Ratepayers.

The Tier "A" portion of Mountain Bell's TelaLease rate
is designed to recover such capital-related costs as depreciation, cost of money, and income taxes.

(Tr. 131, 215-16)

However, while the Tier "A" rate is fixed, these capitalrelated costs are not fixed.

The evidence below demonstrates

that regardless of changes over time in the cost of money,
and in the federal income tax rate, the customer's Tier "A"
payments "will apply without change during the Fixed Rent
Payment Period".

(emphasis added) (See original Sheet 23,

Part 11, Section 6 of the Dimension PBX tariff, R. 1068; Tr.
157.)

When these measurable capital-related costs change dur-

ing the service or economic life of a PBX or key telephone
system, the Tier "A" portion of the

T~laLease

subscriber's

rate should change, just like all other telephone utility subscribers' rates change when these important capital costs increase.

MBT, which never sells equipment but instead provides

a service over time, should not be permitted to guarantee the
unchangeability of any rate.
When the Utah Public Service Commission awards an increased rate of return to the Company in a general rate case,
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or when the applicable federal income tax rate increases,
basic subscribers experience an increase in rates, regardless
of the length of time they have subscribed to, or have agreed to
subscribe to, telephone service.

Under two-tier TelaLease

pricing, two-tier customers, alone, are blessed with the privilege of never having to incur a rate increase to reflect an
increase in capital-related costs.

Two-tier contract sub-

scribers simply do not share the burden of these increased
. costs.

No other MBT subscribers besides certain select busi-

ness customers are offered "a guarantee that a portion of
their rates will not be subject to future rate increases".
(Tr. 156)

Residential customers who subscribe to basic tele-

phone service cannot "obtain that same sort of insulation
against changes in the authorized rate of return by promising
to sign up for a certain number of years of service".
170)

(Tr.

As MBT's witness, Mr. Brown, stated on the· record, " ••

the benefits of lease pricing are not available to a residential customer . • • unless he does require key telephone service".

(Tr. 221)

Intervenor-Appellant's witness, Dr. Wilson, criticized
the application of two-tier TelaLease vintage pricing to
specific services in the following terms:
What MB has proposed in this regard is a
discriminatory pricing structure available only for a certain competitive product, and available to only select cusSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tomers located in market segments of its
business which are vulnerable to competition. The attempt to recover capital investment in a PBX account via a two-tier
pricing mechanism by incorporating a fixedterm payment, while denying this pricing
approach for the recovery of capital investment in other terminal equipment
(su~h as the basic single-line telephone
set) is discriminatory. Thus, for example, if embedded costs continue to increase over time, vintage Dimension PBX
subscribers will be immune from parallel
rate increases, and general telephone
subscribers will be forced to bear the
entire burden.

* * *
. . . Two-tier capital costs are not
fixed for MB. Interest rates on debt,
return on equity, depreciation rates and
income rates change over time. As these
changes occur, although they may be reflected in future vintages, the company
expresses n~ intention to reach back into prior two-tier vintage tariffs in order to adjust the old capital rates to reflect current and future conditions.
Under these circumstances, if, for example, MB's capital costs rise in the
future due to the maturing and refinancing of old cost debt, or if income taxes
were to increase, older Dimension PBX
customers will pay preferentially lower
rates in relation to all other MB ratepayers. This, too~ would result in a
discriminatory rate structure for all
Dimension PBX services.
(Ex. I-8, R.
1535, pp. 43-44)16/
16/Although Dr. Wilson's comments were directed at Dimension
PBX, it is clear that his criticism is directed at the entire two-tier TelaLease vintage pricing concept, and at "the
pricing changes . . . for items of business terminal equipment . . • primarily . . . PBX and key services".
(Tr. 39,
42~ Ex. 2, R. 1492)
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The Staff of the Utah PSC concurred with Dr. Wilson's
analysis.

When asked whether he "saw any discrimination in-

herent in the two-tier lease tariff concept by virtue of the
fact that those rates alone among all of Mountain Bell's rates
are fixed or insulated against change", Mr. Hagstrom responded
"we've got one class of customer • • • who is now going to get
a different pricing option available to him that at the moment
is not available to anybody else.
I guess so".

(Tr. 714-15)

If that's discrimination

The PSC closed its eyes to all

this evidence.
In response to the joint contention of the Commission's
own Staff and Intervenor-Appellant, the Commission's Report
and Order provides only the following conclusory statement:
10. . . . said TelaLease concept is not
discriminatory in nature either to other
PBX customers, to other categories of
telephone customers or as between twotier customers. (Report and Order, p. 11,
R. 1142)

Once again, the basis for the Commission's decision is
obscure or non-existent.

The Report and Order constitutes

little more than an arbitrary dismissal of Intervenor's and
Staff's contention, without any attempt to come to grips with
the issues raised.

It remains impossible to ascertain how or

why the Commission reached the "findings and conclusions"
which appear in its Report and Order.

Blanket generalizations

and summary conclusions are not sufficient in a case of this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 28 -

magnitude and importance.

Other than the unexplained state-

ments of the Commission that the terminal telephone equipment
tariffs which are the subject of the proceeding are "not discriminatory in nature" (Report and Order, p. 11, R. 1142) and
are "non-discriminatory" (Report and Order, p. 12, R. 1142),
no discussion, analysis or any other reference to the discrimination argument, or to the underlying evidence and MBT's
failure to meaningfully refute that evidence, appear anywhere
in the Commission's decision.

The Commission's conclusion is

thus totally naked and unsupported.
By contrast, the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities, in its two-tier contract pricing decision, based
on a record and a tariff virtually identical to the one under
review here, identified and declared illegal the very discrimination described by Dr. Wilson and recognized by Mr. Hogstrom:
Tier A prices are founded upon an assumption of fixed earnings and tax rates.
Between 1970 and 1975, the Department has
authorized four increases in earning
rates for MBT • . • • The federal corporate income rate has fluctuated between
48 and 52 percent, while income tax rates
in the Commonwealth have increased over
the past decade. Under these uncertain
conditions, there· is no assurance what
the required level of capital costs and
tax rates will be five years from now,
let alone for the next decade.

* * *
Unde~

conditions of rising capital costs
and income taxes, Plan I (two-tier) cus-
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tomers would be insulated from any increases in these costs.
In the event of an increase in such costs,
NET would properly stay "whole" in that
it would be entitled to recover all the
taxes and a fair rate of return on its
total investment. If revenue deficiencies were recouped in future years, they
would be recouped from other classes of
ratepayers.

* * *
Accordingly, the 2-tier plan can be rejected on the basis that it is unjustly
discriminatory as against other classes
of ratepayers. (Mass. D.P.U. Docket 18403,
Decision of April 21, 1976, pp. 21-23,
aff'd, New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
D.P.U. 363 N.E. 2d 519 (Mass. Sup. Ct.
1977) (emphasis added)
On appeal, in affirming the Department's rejection of
two-tier contract pricing, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. held that the D.P.U. 's disapproval of "rates which are
unjust, unreasonable and otherwise discriminatory" was supported by "substantial evidence".· (New England Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. D.P.U., 363 N.E. 2d 519 Mass, Sup. Ct. 1977)
The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated:
From this evidence, a reasonable mind
could conclude that the Plan I price
structure discriminated against customers of NET's non-competitive services;
that the ratemaking processes encouraged
discrimination in favor of competitive services; and that Plan I, therefore, was
not in the public interest. (New England
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. D.P.U., 363 N.E. 2d at
524)
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The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence
submitted below in this case is the one reached by the
Massachusetts regulatory body and affirmed by the Massachusetts
17/
Supreme Court.~
Attempts by regulated Bell System operating telephone
companies to fix terminal telephone equipment rates have been
rejected by other conscientious regulatory commissions besides
the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities.

For example,

the Montana Public Service Commission, in Docket No. 6496,
stated in its Order No. 4389d of September 29, 1978:
Included in the Tela-Lease contract is
the provision that tier A rates will remain unchanged for the duration of the
lease. The Commission reserves the right
17/Very recently, the Massachusetts D.P.U. finally did approve a modified two-tier payment plan, but only after the
New England Telephone and Telegraph Company struck from its
two-tier .tariff all references to a fixed rate for the term
of the .contract. The Mass. D.P.u. required the incorporation
into NET's two-tier tariff of a practical, built-in safeguard
against cross-subsidization in the form of an automatic Tier
"A" supplement charge whenever there is any increase in capital costs. The D.P.U. stated:
in order to address the question of
future cross-subsidization, any increase
in capital costs would have to apply automatically to Tier "A" customers when ~
creased just as the increase would apply
to other classes of ratepayers. (Mass.
D.P.U. 19319, Order of March 31, 1978,
pp. 7-8) (emphasis in original)
The notion of a capital cost-related rate which is guaranteed
against change was thus totally and finally rejected a second
time by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities.
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to change this portion of the two-tier
when its analysis indicates that an adjustment is warranted. To do otherwise
would be to abrogate the Commission's
responsibility for ongoing regulation of
utility rates. The Tela-Lease contract
shall inform customers that tier A payments may be changed by Commission action.
(Order No. 4389d, Sept. 29, 1978, Finding
77 at p. 28)
Similarly, the Nebraska Public Service Commission, in
Application No. 31287, entered June 24, 1976, although it allowed a modified form of two-tier lease pricing for Northwestern
Bell Telephone Company wrote:
First, the provisions declaring that Tier
"A" rates are fixed, not subject to change
should not be allowed. The tariffs should
be modified in order to clearly indicate
to customers that Tier "A" rates are subject to the jurisdiction of this Commission
and are subject to change upon order of the
Commission and all customers subscribing to
two-tier rates should be so notified.
(Order, p. 6)
Similarly, although the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission
approved a modified two-tier rate, it ruled:
New England Telephone Company cannot guarantee "no change" in Tier "A" rates to
potential customers, in view of this
Commission's jurisdiction over said
rates and our ability to change said
rates on our own motion. (Docket 1207,
Opinion dated September 13, 1976, p. 10)
In sum, the Commission erred in approving a payment
structure which the record evidence shows unequivocally to
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18/

be highly

discriminatory.~

18/In this connection, it is ironic that the one gratuitous
concession in the Commission's decision to the challenge to
two-tier TelaLease tariffs posed by Intervenor and the
Commission staff is really no concession at all.
Finding No.
13 of the Report and Order states:
In order that customers entering into
TelaLease with Mountain Bell might not be
misled as to the continuing jurisdiction
of this Commission, it is necessary that
all tariffs relating to the TelaLease and
the lease document itself contain language
indicating that the Commission may at any
time by proper administrative procedure
change the variable portion of the "Tier
B" under said leases.
(Report and Order,
P: 12, R. 1142) (emphasis added)
This qu~~ation is the most glaring illustration of the
Commission's failure to carefully consider the evidence in
this case. The sole "revision" or "modification" to the
tariffs ·ordered by the Commission really amounts to nothing
more than a restat~ment of what i~ already contained in the
proposed tariff. There never was any dispute in this case
concerning the changeability of the "variable" portion of the
Tier B rate, so that the Commission's order does not modify
the original tariff at all.
(Ex. I-6, R. 1534, Tr. 71) Had
the Commission really reflected upon and considered the arguments and the evidence in this case, it would not, and it
c6uld not, in good conscience, have ordered an alleged "revision" which is really nothing more than a recapitulation of
the tariff as initially proposed by MBT.
It was always the
fixed "Tier A" rate, and the constant portion of the "Tier B",
which were the focal points of contention, and not the admittedly changeable, variable portion of the "Tier B" rate.
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C.

The Methodology Utilized By Mountain Bell To Compute
Net Book Investment For Two-Tier TelaLease Rate-Making
Purposes Establishes The Dependency Of Two-Tier
TelaLease Pricing On The Existence Of Monopoly Revenues.

The evidence before the Commission demonstrates unequivocally that the "equated cost of money" ("ECM") methodology
utilized by Mountain Bell to determine net book investment for
two-tier TelaLease rate-making purposes necessarily results
in rates which require cross-subsidization by other Mountain
Bell ratepayers.

(See Intervenor-Appellant's Brief to the

Commission, pp. 102-05, R. 1376-79.)

For two-tier TelaLease

tariff purposes only, Mountain Bell computes the rate of return, or cost of money, based on only 62.5% of total original
investment.

(Tr. 908-09)

Intervenor urged below that Mountain

Bell's cost of money, or rate of return, for two-tier TelaLease
purposes be based upon the Company's system-wide depreciation
factor in 1975, which was in excess of 85%.

(Ex. I-12, R.

1540)
The record evidence below shows that, under Mountain
Bell's "equated cost of money" approach, during the first half
of an asset's life (a PBX or a key telephone system), before
the actually declining net book investment reaches the average,
or mid-way point, of net book investment for a particular
asset, the difference, or defficiency, must be made up by
Mountain Bell's general ratepayers.

Although, admittedly,

the total cost of capital may be finally realized at the very
end of the last year of a particular two-tier TelaLease asset's
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life, so long as the number of two-tier TelaLease assets continues to increase over time, there will exist a perpetual deficiency which must be made up by monopoly revenues.

As

Intervenor-Appellant's expert witness, Dr. Wilson, stated:
. . • We're dealing with a growing element within the Company's ove~all rate
base. Dimension PBX systems are growing
in leaps and bounds in terms of proportionate share of the rate base . . . .
If you take a growing entity . . . and
you apply the equated cost of money you're
going to end up with a repeated deficit
year after year after year. That's why
when you establish rates for a regulated
electric utility you make a - you make an
adjustment to the gross investment and
plant and equipment by subtracting out
accrued depreciation, but that usually
winds up with a net investment of somewhere in the 75 to 85 percent of gross
investment ballpark. (Tr. 936-37)
It is essential, if two-tier rate-making is to be allowed at
19/
all,- that c;tn appropriate depreciation factor be utilized
which will be applicable, "over the period of time that the
19/Although two-tier TelaLease pricing must be rejected for
several reasons, it should be noted that it is theoretically
possible to offer two-tier lease payment plans without utilizing the equated cost of money concept. For example, Dr.
Wilso.n used a much higher net or depreciated investment
figure in his two-tier cost study than the 62% which results
from MBT's ECM methodology. (Ex. I-8, 1535) Massachusetts
has not allowed its local Bell Operating Telephone Company to
utilize the ECM methodology in the modified two-tier lease payment plans which its regulatory body approved five months ago,
and the California Public Utilities Commission has recognized
the burden imposed on other groups of subscribers by the use,
for two-tier tariff subscribers, of the equated cost of money
methodology (See Ex. I-8, R. 1535, J.W.-16, p. 3.), and has rejected ECM even though it has allowed some ~wo-tier rates.
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rates are going to be in effect".

(Tr. 939)

As if none of this evidence existed, the Commission's
Report and Order contains no mention whatsoever of the
Company's use of the "equated cost of money" methodology for
two-tier TelaLease pricing purposes.

No findings, discussion

or reference to any of the evidence relating to the "equated
cost of money" methodology appears anywhere in the Commission's
decision.

Other than the Commission's glib assertion that all

the business terminal telephone equipment services in question
"are priced at level which will recover for Mountain Bell all
of its costs associated with the provision of said products
and services," (Report and Order, p. 11, R. 1142) none of the
intricacies of the net investment costing methodologies proposed by Mountain Bell, on the one hand, and by IntervenorAppellant, on the other, are even referenced, much less resolved,· by the Commission.
By contrast, the very "equated cost of money" methodology
problems called to this Commission's attention by IntervenorAppellant were recognized and acknowledged by the Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities:
A key component of the 2-Tier methodology
is the ECM principle • . • under which
reimbursement for capital costs would be
obtained. As we see it, the ECM procedure
is a completely valid procedure for preparing engineering economy studies~ i·~··
making investment choices when capital additions and revenues are contemplated at
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different time intervals. We find the
application of the ECM methodology, however, wholly inappropriate for utility
rate-making.

* * *
. . • If we were dealing with a static
plant, the impact on total revenues would
not be perceptible. However, 2-Tier pricing is being proposed by NET for its most
advanced and presumably most rapidly growing PBX offering. Under situations of
market growth, we have substantially a
negative flow-through effect . . . . As
the gross plant investment increases year
by year, the cumulative revenue deficiencies between the sum of annuity payments
and a corresponding depreciation, return
and taxes widens.

* * *
The company can contemplate the offering
of 2-Tier pricing on a present worth annuity basis only because of its monopoly
position. Approximately 90% of company
revenues are derived from monopoly service classifications. Deficiencies in
return during the early stages of Dimension
PBX service can be recouped through overall state-wide rate of return adjustments.
To apply ECM procedures universally to
all NET services would ensure corporate
insolvency. (D.P.U. 18403, Decision of
April 21, 1976, pp. 17, 19, 21) (emphasis added)20/
20/Similarly, in its recent Dimension two-tier decision, the
Montana Public Service Commission reasoned as follows:
The ECM-FGR debate revolves around the
question: Are Dimension • . . services
provided by single units of investment
or assets which are members of a pool?
In Finding of Fact No. 77, the Commission
(footnote continued on next page)
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The Utah Commission totally ignored all the record evidence dealing with the "equated cost of money" methodology,
evidence which shows that its use makes two-tier TelaLease
tariffs dependent, for their compensatory sufficiency, on the
existence of monopoly revenues.

The "equated cost of money"

methodology necessitates the use of non-two-tier TelaLease
revenues to cross-subsidize two-tier TelaLease subscribers in
the earlier years of their service, and thus constitutes a
classic transfer of monopoly power in further violation of
federal antitrust law.

(United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.

100 (1948); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410

u.s.

366 (1973))
In sum, the Commission erred in approving, by its silence, the equated cost of money methodology.· This is but one
additional reason why the overwhelming weight of the evidence
below compels the conclusion that two-tier TelaLease pricing
violates the antitrust laws.
(footnote continued from previous page}
has rejected the proposal of unchanging
tier A payments which would have resulted
in vintage pricing. Consistent with that
earlier Finding, the equated cost of money
method is rejected in favor of the forecasted growth reserve approach which computes the return requirement on average
net investment in an equipment account
rather than on average investment in a
single piece of equipment. An undepreciated balance of 77.98% shall be used for
PBX's . . . . (Order No. 4389d, Sept. 29,
1978, Finding 92 at p. 34)
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POINT II - THE COMMISSION ERRED IN APPROVING AN INCREMENTAL
COSTING METHODOLOGY FOR USE BY MOUNTAIN BELL IN CONNECTION
WITH COMPETITIVE SERVICE OFFERINGS.
As noted by the Commission in its Report and Order (p. 7,
R. 1140), Mountain Bell asserted below that its terminal telephone equipment tariffs "covered all of its incremental costs
of providing these . • . services".

(emphasis added)

Mountain

Bell rel1ed on a so-called Long-Run Incremental Analysis (LRIA)
wnich proportedly takes into account "cost factors, demand
elasticity, cross-elasticity, payment plans, incrementalism
and contribution".

(Report and Order, p. 7)

In contrast to

the marginal or incremental pricing approach which the
Commission approved for Mountain Bell's terminal equipment
services, Intervenor-Appellant, and the Commission's own staff,
urged that a true fully allocated costing
(Ex~ D~l,

~ethodology

be used.

R. 1526, pp. 4, 6-7; Tr. 397-98; Tr. 949, 951-52;

Tr. 995-98, 1009)
The difference between these two costing methodologies
has to do primarily with the sufficiency of Mountain Bell's
allocation, in its Dimension PBX and ComKey tariffs, for an
aliquot portion of common overhead Company costs.

Taking only

"directly related administration costs" into account, Mountain
Bell utilized an administrative overhead factor of 6.5% (Tr.
452, 925), whereas Intervenor-Appellant proposed an allocation
equal to 9.85% of total investment (Ex. I-8, R. 1535, p. 53,
J.W.-15(a); Tr. 934-35)
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Intervenor-Petitioner submits that the Commission eroneously lent its approval to a costing methodology which does
not account for an appropriate portion of common administrative overhead costs.
Mountain Bell argued below that no allowance whatsoever
should be made for fixed, or common, overhead costs.
60, 232, 830, 883)

(Tr.

The Company's position is that rather than

select a formula which might be deemed "arbitrary", it preferred to make no allocation at all.

Dr. Wilson, Intervenor-

Appellant's expert witness, found:
MB's rates do not include a proper allocation of joint costs which are shared
with other services. Instead, they cover·
only costs directly attributable to
Dimension PBX service. Thus, "overhead"
costs have been excluded. Overhead includes such items as headquarters buildings and general office buildings, heating and lighting costs associated with
those buildings, executive salar-ies, lawyers' fees, etc. The assignment of all
these costs to monopoly. telephone services constitutes a direct subsidy of
Dimension PBX. Obviously, such costs
must be included in tne determination of
the prices of products sold in competitive markets. (Ex. I-8, R. 1535, p. 7)
The record evidence also contains testimony which indicates that, in addition to being non-compensatory, MBT's costing methodology is anti-competitive.

Speaking of Mountain

Bell's short-run incremental pricing methodology, Dr. Wilson
stated:
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The result is to create an unfair economic
advantage for MB in the pricing of its PBX
products. Competitors must recover all
their costs; they simply do not have the
artificial advantage of being able to
arbitrarily charge off some cost elements
to non-competitive lines of enterprise
and thereby suosidize their competitive
operations. For MB to allocate Dimension
PBX overhead costs to the rate base and
operating expenses of the franchised portion of its general telephone utility operations is ruinous to independent PBX
competitors and unfair to MB's other telephone utility subscribers who are faced
with monopoly conditions and have no
choice but to pay inflated prices that
are high enough to cover these unfairly
allocated rate base and operating expenses in addition to their own costs of
service.
To allow one competitor (MB) to allocate
some of its costs to other product lines
that are protected from competition, and
recover those costs from its monopoly
lines, cannot be justified on rational
economic grounds.
(Ex. I-8, R. 1535, pp.
8-9)
MBT's LRIA analysis, which forms the theoretical justification for its incremental pricing methodology, purportedly
makes a "contribution" to common overhead.

(See Tr. 61, 283.)

But there is no way of determining whether the alleged marginal "contribution" is sufficient to actually recover all
costs.

According to MBT, one purpose of the LRIA is to serve

as "a tool for selecting prices".

(Tr. 63)

Mountain Bell's

LRIA pays lip service to costs such as premature retirement,
and common overhead, but makes no attempt to quantify these
costs.

The LRIA offered by Mountain Bell is nothing more than
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its own self-serving judgment and guesswork about possible
market activity.

No economic data, or quantifiable elasticity

of demand, appears.

The LRIA thus amounts to pure guesswork

performed by Company executives whose duty it is to justify a
price long-since designed not to meet costs, but to suppress
competition.

The guesswork is then fed into a complicated

game theory which projects what old and new customers would
or might do - again without any empirical data or experience
whatsoever.

Mountain Bell's witness even admitted that he

had no idea, for example, "how much it is costing or will cost"
for "the telephone company to proceed
here in Utah".

throug~

this proceeding

(Tr. 436)

Once again, in response to this evidence, the Commission
made virtually no findings whatsoever.

Once again, other

than its glib assertion that all of the business terminal
telephone equipment services at issue "are priced at a level
which will recover for Mountain Bell all of its costs associated with the provision of said products and services"
(Report and Order, p. 11, R. 1142), none of the conflict between costing methodologies which saturates the record is even
referenced, much less resolved, by the Commission.
By contrast, in other jurisdictions where the same conflict in costing methodologies has arisen, state commissions
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sues.

Thus, based on a record virtually identical to that

before the Utah Commission, the Montana Public Service
Commission concluded:
The Commission finds that Mountain Bell's
long run incremental analysis is not an
appropriate procedure for price setting
by a regulated utility selling in both
monopoly and competitive markets.
Responsible regulation by this Commission
is premised on iis ability to compare
rates with the cost of service, insuring
that the proposed rates are compensatory.
On relying on forecasted costs and market
conditions, LRIA provides less assurance
that rates will cove~ actual costs than
does a comparison of rates with historic
costs. LRIA considers only those costs
the utility regards as incremental, thus
creating the possibility of cross-subsidization if rates based on such analysis do
not cover full costs including an allocation of common overheads. With the
Company's residual pricing policy, the
potential subsidy would be from basic exchange ratepayers to those using competitive services.
(Montana Public Service
Commission, Docket No. 6496, Order No.
4389d, Sept. 29, 1978, Finding 63 at pp.
22-23.
(emphasis added)
The Montana Public Service Commission appropriately coneluded, "to insure the absense of cross-subsidies, rates for
telephone services should be set equal to fully-distributed
costs".

(Order No. 4389d, Finding 67 at p. 24)

In addition, after considering arguments in favor of incremental costs by the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company
very similar to those advanced below by Mountain Bell, the
California Public Utilities Commission, last year, cogently
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and concisely reasoned:
Where a public utility and a non-regulated
enterprise are competing for the same market and scarcity of products or service is
not a factor, the proper choice becomes
quite clear. The use of the incremental
cost concept to justify the price of an
offering by the utility in such a competitive situation would allow the utility to
allocate its overhead and fixed costs to
its monopoly services. Leaving the effects of such an allocation on the utility's competitors aside, incremental cost
pricing would obviously be unfair to the
utility's monopoly customers in that they
would bear all costs except the incremental
costs associated with competitive markets.
The unfairness of the incremental cost approach on the utility's monopoly customers
would alone be sufficient to rule its use.
The requirement that we must consider the
anti-competitive aspects of the utility's
offering upon suppliers who have no monopoly service to bear the overhead and fixed
costs further militates against incremental
cost pricing. (Cal. P.u.c., Decision No.
87962, October 12, 1977, p. 47)21/
21/Similarly, the New York Public Service Commission, last
year, had occasion to comment on the use of a long-run
incremental analysis by the New York Telephone Company to
justify its terminal telephone equipment rates. In denying
a request for subpoena duces ~, the New York Commission
wrote:
It is the Commission's opinion that the
issue presented • • • is whether the
rates chosen by New York Telephone
Company are compensatory, not whether
the rates chosen by the Company are
superior to other rates in the sense that
they will maximize the net revenue contribution from the service • • • • (TJ he
Commission will give no weight to any
claim by the Company that its proposed
(footnote continued on next page)
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So too, in this case, the Commission should have rejected
the Company's so-called LRIA.

The Commission should have de-

manded a full and complete cost study which fairly takes into
account all costs associated with competitive services, ineluding a fair portion of the common overhead of the firm.
Although the main thrust of this Point II has to do with
the non-compensatory nature of Mountain Bell's incremental
costing methodology, it must be noted that the use of marginal
or incremental cost pricing, absent a proper allocation for
fixed overheads, has been declared illegal under the federal
antitrust laws.

More than half a century ago, in Northern

Pacific Railway v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585 (1915),
the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the pricing of utility services on an incremental or "out-of-pocket"
cost basis:
• • • (W]e entertain no doubt that in determing the cost of the transportation of
a particular commodity, all the outlays
which pertain to it must be considered.
We find no basis for distinguishing in
this respect between the so-called "outof-pocket c~sts", or "actual" expenses
and other outlays which are nonetheless
actually made because they are applicable to all traffic in question.
(footnote continued from previous page)
rates will optimize the revenue contribution from the service.
(N.Y.P.S.C. Case
27006, letter of S.R. Madison, Secretary,
to K.J. Roland, January 25, 1977) (emphasis added)
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It is not sufficent reason for excluding
such, or other, expenses to say that they
would still have been incurred had the
particular commodity not been transported.
That commodity has been transported; the
common carrier is under a duty to carry,
and the expenses of its business at a
particular time are attributable to what
it does carry . . . The outlays that exclusively pertain to a given class of traffic must be assigned to that class, and
the other expenses must be fairly apportioned. It may be difficult to make such
an apportionment, but once conclusions
are based on cost, the entire cost must
be taken into account. (Northern
Pacific Railway, supra, at 596-97) (emphasis added)
In more recent years, the United States Supreme Court,
in American Commercial Lines v. Louisville & Nashville
Railway co., 392 U.S. 571 (1968), upheld an ICC determination
that inter-modal transportation competitive rates should be
set on the basis of fully distributed costs, as opposed to
22/
Without belaboring the
out-of-pocket or marginal costs.
point further, numerous lower court and state court decisions are to the same effect.

See,

~.g.,

Inglis & Sons

Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas.
Para. 60146 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1975); Tri-Cue, Inc. v. Sta-High
Corp., 45 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1965); Northern Natual Power Co. v.
22/And see AT&T Long Lines Department (Revisions of Tariff
FCC No.~O Private Line Services 5000 (TelPak), 61 FCC 2d
587, 615 (1976), where the Federal Communications Commission
mandated use by carriers of fully distributed costs in the determination of rate levels.
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City of St. Paul, 99 N.W. 2d 207 (Minn. 1957); St. Michael's
Utilities Comm'n. v. The Eastern Shore Public Service Co. of
Maryland, 35 F.P.C. 591, aff'd, 377 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1967);
Paine v. Washington Metropolitan Area ·rransit Comm'n, 415 F.2d
910 ( D. C. Cir • 19 6 8 ) •
This is plainly not a case which falls within the ambit
of the Tenth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals' recent decision
in Pacific Eng. & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee, 551 F.2d 790 (10th
Cir. 1977).

While the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in that

case allowed AMPOT, a multi-product firm, to utilize incremental costs, that case is plainly distinguishable from the
one at bar in that all of AMPOT's operations were in competitive markets.

Mountain Bell, on the other hand, is engaged

in a variety of operations which fall both within the competitive and monopoly areas.
There is nothing illegal under the antitrust laws, nor
should there be, about a multi-product, totally competitive,
firm engaging in cross-subsidization.

If the price of compe-

titive product "A" is raised to cross-subsidize competitive
product "B", then, sooner or later, competitive product "A"
will be priced out of the market in which it competes.
Product "A" sales will have been sacrificed for the benefit
of product "S" sales.
respect to MST.

The same statement cannot be made with

MST cannot be priced out of its monopoly mar-
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kets in the State of Utah.

Where Mountain Bell's general tele-

phone exchange services are concerned, it enjoys an absolute
monopoly and it need not concern itself with raising prices
above those of its competitors.

It has no competitors in the

general exchange service market.

Thus, while the use of in-

cremental pricing may have been permissible with respect to
AMPOT, it is impermissible and totally unacceptable where MBT
is concerned.

Any reliance by Mountain Bell on the Pacific

Engineering decision would ignore the

di~ference

between a

completely competitive, multi-product company and a multiproduct company which is engaged in the provision of both competitive and monopoly services.
The Commission erred in approving Mountain Bell's incremental cost methodology.
Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, the Final Report and Order
of the Public Service Commission of Utah in PSC Case No.
76-049-01 should be reversed; all two-tier TelaLease contracts
entered into by Mountain Bell with its customers since December
2, 1977 should be set aside; and Mountain Bell should be
directed not to offer any additional terminal telephone equip-
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ment services on a two-tier TelaLease payment plan or on the
basis of tariffs based on an incremental costing methodology.
Respectfully submitted,
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